Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Berden Caroline 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: The Role of Individual Intertemporal Transfers in Dynamic TU-Games
Abstract: Dynamic TU-games are considered which consist of a finite player set, a finite sequence of TU-games and a profile of intertemporal utility functions. At every stage a (restrictively) additive solution is applied to the TU-game, which results in a stream of payoff distributions, evaluated by the intertemporal utility functions of the players. Players are able to transfer payoffs between stages. The strategic possibilities from individual transfers between periods are modeled by a noncooperative game. Conditions under which a Nash equilibrium in this noncooperative game exists, are established. It is shown when a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies is Pareto optimal.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2007
Number: 030
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:926ed88d-6437-438a-975c-dc6e2c5cbd13/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 228065
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2007030