Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Peeters Ronald 
Author-Name: Vorsatz Marc 
Author-Name: Walzl Markus 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Rewards in an Experimental Sender-Receiver Game
Abstract: We show in a sender-receiver game with strictly opposing interests that rewards enhance trust but do not influence truth-telling. Subjects who reward tend to tell the truth and trust more often in the presence and absence of reward opportunities. The amount of obtained rewards thereby enhances truth-telling.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2007
Number: 019
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:43f3fb2d-8a34-4445-8627-37187987c720/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 118633
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2007019