Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Reiss, J. Philipp 
Author-Name: Schöndube Jens Robert 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: First-Price Equilibrium and Revenue Equivalence in a Sequential Procurement Auction Model
Abstract: We analyze first-price equilibrium bidding behavior of capacity-constrained firms in a sequence of two procurement auctions. In the model, firms with a cost advantage in completing the project auctioned off at the end of the sequence may enter the unfavored first auction hoping to lose it. Equilibrium bidding in both auctions deviates from the standard Symmetric Independent Private Value auction model (SIPV) due to opportunity costs of bidding created by possibly employed capacity.For this sequential auction model with non-identical objects, we show that revenue equivalence holds.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2007
Number: 003
File-URL: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=1221
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 288697
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2007003