Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Kóczy László Á. 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Strategic power indices: Quarrelling in coalitions
Abstract: While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the indices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour.
Keywords: Economics (Jel: A)
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2006
Number: 049
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:53e863df-128b-4148-96f5-ce0b1b7e57c6/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 211636
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2006049