Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Klaus Bettina 
Author-Name: Walzl Markus 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts
Abstract: We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting stable sets and pairwise stable sets for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from obtaining “set inclusion results'''' on all three domains, we prove that for substitutable preferences the set of pairwise stable matchings is nonempty and coincides with the set of weakly setwise stable matchings. For strongly substitutable preferences the set of pairwise stable matchings coincides with the set of setwise stable matchings. We also show that Roth’s (1984) stability coincides with pairwise stability for substitutable preferences.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2006
Number: 042
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:71cdb3e4-d437-48e3-8d32-e6ecc3388179/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 273309
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2006042