Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Leufkens, Kasper 
Author-Name: Peeters, Ronald 
Author-Name: Vorsatz, Marc 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Sequential auctions with synergies: An experimental analysis
Abstract: In this paper we show experimentally that in a sequential auction the presence of synergies leads to more overbidding which in turn may result in bankruptcies. In line with theoretical predictions we find that the seller benefits from the buyers’ synergies. In contrast to theory the buyers also benefit from these synergies. Moreover, opposed to theory and many empirical findings we do not observe declining prices. Finally we find that the overbidding is increasing in the valuation of the object on which the synergy does not materialize and we attribute this finding to anchoring.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2006
Number: 040
File-URL: http://arnop.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=5334
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 525178
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2006040