Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Massó Jordi 
Author-Name: Vorsatz Marc 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Weighted Approval Voting
Abstract: To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting [7] by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects all alternatives for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this voting procedure.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2006
Number: 038
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:40f23b85-5977-42c6-8424-ab63619e701b/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 274704
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2006038