Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Maus,Stefan
Author-Name: Peters,Hans
Author-Name: Storcken,Ton 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
Abstract: We compare the manipulability of different choice rules by considering the number of manipulable profiles. We establish the minimal number of such profiles for tops-only, anonymous, and surjective choice rules, and show that this number is attained by unanimity rules with status quo.
Keywords: public economics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2005
Number: 009
File-URL: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=1044
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 223346
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2005009