Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Kóczy László Á. 
Author-Name: Lauwers Luc 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
Abstract: A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core. We provide an algorithm to find the minimal dominant set.
Keywords: mathematical economics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2004
Number: 018
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:b47c1042-2273-4c72-a2d1-92adb383b161/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 260699
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2004018