Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Maus,Stefan
Author-Name: Peters,Hans
Author-Name: Storcken,Ton
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Minimal manipulability: Unanimity and Nondictatorship
Abstract: This paper is concerned with the number of profiles at which a nondictatorial social choice function is manipulable. For three or more alternatives the lower bound is derived when the social choice function is nondictatorial and unanimous. In the case of three alternatives the lower bound is also derived when the social choice function is nondictatorial and surjective. In both cases all social choice functions reaching that lower bound are characterized when there are at least three agents. In the case of two agents the characterized social choice functions are only a subset of the set of all social choice functions reaching the minimum.
Keywords: mathematical economics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2004
Number: 005
File-URL: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=869
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 239792
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2004005