Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Maus,Stefan
Author-Name: Peters,Hans
Author-Name: Storcken,Ton
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Strategy-proof voting for single issues and cabinets
Abstract: In a model with a continuum of voters with symmetric single-peaked preferences on the one-dimensional unit interval (representing the political spectrum) a voting rule assigns to each profile of votes a point in the interval. We characterize all voting rules that are strategy-proof, anonymous, Pareto optimal, and which satisfy a weak form of continuity. This result paves the way for studying cabinet formation rules. A cabinet is an interval which has obtained sufficiently many votes. The main result on cabinet formation is a characterization of all cabinet formation rules that are strategy-proof with respect to the endpoints of the cabinet, anonymous, Pareto optimal, and continuous.
Keywords: public economics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2003
Number: 044
File-URL: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=799
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 256844
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2003044