Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Maus Stefan
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: The Expected Shapley Value
Abstract: A method to allocate the benefits to the players of a cooperative game is the Shapley value. Its computation demands the knowledge of all coaltion worths with certainty. This paper introduces the expected Shapley value, an extension of the Shapley to games were not all the worths are known with certainty. The expected Shapley value is characterized with adapted versions of Young''s (1985) and Shapley''s (1953) properties. It is shown how representation with unanimity games, dividend and potential genrelazie when not all worths are known with certainty. We relate the expected Shapley value to the reduced and the normalized Shapley value introduced by Wilson (1993) and Housman (2001) for games where some coalition worths are not known.
Keywords: Economics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2003
Number: 034
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:668fc41d-8207-408d-b128-5d1cedbeedcf/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 226179
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2003034