Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Grigorieva,Elena
Author-Name: Herings,P. Jean-Jacques
Author-Name: Müller,Rudolf
Author-Name: Vermeulen,Dries
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: The private value single item bisection auction
Abstract: In this paper we present a new iterative auction, the bisection auction, that can be used for the sale of a single indivisable object. We will show that the bisection auction is computationally more efficient than the classical English auction while it still preserves all characteristics the English auction shares with the Vickrey auction there exists an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies in wich everyone truthfully reveals his information, the object is allocated in accordance with efficiency requirements to the buyer who has the highest valuation, and the price paid by the winner of the object equals the second-highest valuation.
Keywords: Economics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2002
Number: 051
File-URL: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=675
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 315600
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2002051