Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Bossert,Walter
Author-Name: Derks,Jean
Author-Name: Peters,Hans
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games
Abstract: A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided. 
Keywords: mathematical economics and econometrics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2001
Number: 002
File-URL: http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=263
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 202462
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2001002