Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Beetsma Roel M.W.J.
Author-Name: Bovenberg A. Lans
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers
Abstract: We show that, with benevolent policymakers and fiscal leadership, monetary unification reduces inflation, taxes and public spending. These disciplining effects of a monetary union, which rise with the number of fiscal players in the union, are likely to raise welfare. Joining an optimally designed monetary union is particularly attractive if fiscal authorities do not care about inflation. Fiscal coordination offsets the disciplining effects of monetary unification. Hence, subsidiarity in fiscal policymaking may enhance welfare. Keywords: monetary union, fiscal leadership, common central bank, discipline, optimal institutions, inflation, taxation, spending, fiscal coordination. 
Keywords: international economics and trade ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 1995
Number: 024
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:9b25542d-86e8-4261-89f7-092bf79282a9/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 301093
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:1995024