Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Klaus Bettina
Author-Name: Peters Hans
Author-Name: Storcken Ton
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and initial endowments
Abstract: We consider the problem of (re)allocating the total endowment of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences and initial endowments. We propose an extension of the so-called uniform rule and show that it is the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality, and an equal-treatment condition. This last condition is implied by the combination of anonymity and translation invariance, which fact is used to obtain a second characterization. The resulting rule turns out to be peaks-only and individually rational: the allocation assigned by the rule depends only on the peaks of the preferences, and no agent is worse off than at his initial endowment. 
Keywords: mathematical economics and econometrics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 1995
Number: 001
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:5103c82d-93e1-4fa1-b521-970186c38374/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 209587
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:1995001