Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Kriechel Ben
Author-Name: Ziesemer Thomas
Author-workplace-name: MERIT
Title: The Environmental Porter Hypothesis as a Technology Adoption Problem?
Abstract: The Porter Hypothesis postulates that the costs of compliance with environmental standards may be offset by adoption of innovations they trigger. We model this hypothesis using a game of timing of technology adoption. We show that times of adoption are earlier the higher the non-adoption tax. The environmental tax turns the preemption game with low profits into a game with credible precommitment yielding high profits (pro-Porter). If there is a precommitment game without environmental taxes, the introduction of a tax leads to lower profits (anti-Porter). 
Keywords: economics of technology ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2005
Number: 008
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:7da2cef6-a8cc-4c7f-9cf0-3086e92e2f2f/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 356699
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamer:2005008