Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Decker,Torsten
Author-Name: Stiehler,Andreas
Author-Name: Strobel,Martin
Author-workplace-name: MERIT
Title: A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games - An Experimental Study
Abstract: In this experimental study we analyse three collective and one individual punishmentrule in a public good setting. We show that under all punishment rules cooperationis stronger and more sustainable than reported from settings without punishment.Moreover, we present evidence and explanations for differences between the rulesconcerning punishment intensity, contribution and profit levels, as well as justice.Finally, we investigate influences crucial to participants’ support for a collective rulewhen the individual rule is the status quo. We show that beside profit differences thedegree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of supportby the participants.
Keywords: mathematical economics and econometrics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2002
Number: 020
File-URL: http://arnop.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=210
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 460272
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamer:2002020