Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Herings P.J.J. 
Author-Name: Mauleon A. 
Author-Name: Vannetelbosch V. 
Author-workplace-name: GSBE
Title: Stability of networks under level-k farsightedness
Abstract: We provide a tractable concept that can be used to study the influence of the degree of farsightedness on network stability. A set of networks GK is a level-K farsightedly stable set if three conditions are satisfied. First, external deviations should be deterred. Second, from any network outside of GK there is a sequence of farsighted improving paths of length smaller than or equal to K leading to some network in GK. Third, there is no proper subset of GK satisfying the first two conditions.We show that a level-K farsightedly stable set always exists and we provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of a level-K farsightedly stable set. There is a unique level-1 farsightedly stable set G1 consisting of all networks that belong to closed cycles. Level-K farsighted stability leads to a refinement of G1 for generic allocation rules. We then provide easy to verify conditions for a set to be level-K farsightedly stable and we consider the relationship between level-K farsighted stability and efficiency of networks. We show the tractability of the concept by applying it to a model of criminal networks.
Keywords: Sociology of Economics; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General; Production and Organizations: General; 
Classification-JEL: A14; C70; D20; .
Series:  research memorandum
Creation-Date: 2014
Number: 030
File-URL: http://pub.maastrichtuniversity.nl/17a8d1b5-aca1-4303-96ac-d62bd9ab3fe2
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 584459
Handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2014030