Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Can B. 
Author-workplace-name: GSBE
Title: Distance rationalizability of scoring rules
Abstract: Collective decision making problems can be seen as finding an outcome that is closest to a concept of consensus. 1 introduced Closeness to Unanimity Procedure as a first example to this approach and showed that the Borda rule is the closest to unanimity under swap distance a.k.a the 2 distance. 3 shows that the Dodgson rule is the closest to Condorcet under swap distance. 4, 5 generalized this concept as distance-rationalizability, where being close is measured via various distance functions and with many concepts of consensus, e.g., unanimity, Condorcet etc. In this paper, we show that all non-degenerate scoring rules can be distance-rationalized as Closeness to Unanimity procedures under a class of weighted distance functions introduced in 6. Therefore, the results herein generalizes 1 and builds a connection between scoring rules and a generalization of the Kemeny distance, i.e. weighted distances.
Keywords: Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; 
Classification-JEL: C63; D71; D72; D74; .
Series:  Research Memorandum
Creation-Date: 2013
Number: 068
File-URL: http://pub.maastrichtuniversity.nl/b4a7f598-9999-483d-bf7d-a7b720483710
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 313403
Handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013068