Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Bossert W. 
Author-Name: Peters H.J.M. 
Author-workplace-name: GSBE
Title: Single-basined choice
Abstract: Single-basined preferences generalize single-dipped preferences by allowing for multiple worst elements.  These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of single-basinedness in a choice-theoretic setting.  In conjunction with independence of irrelevant alternatives, single-basined choice implies a structure that conforms to the motivation underlying our definition.  We also establish the consequences of requiring single-basined choice correspondences to be upper semicontinuous, and of the revealed preference relation to be Suzumura consistent.
Keywords: Consumer Economics: Theory; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations; 
Classification-JEL: D11; D71; .
Series:  Research Memorandum
Creation-Date: 2013
Number: 030
File-URL: http://pub.maastrichtuniversity.nl/7e06f15f-8d5b-4a36-a182-25376f77a308
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 182738
Handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013030