Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Öztürk Murat 
Author-Name: Peters Hans 
Author-Name: Storcken Ton 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
Abstract: In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a disc in theEuclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the disc. It is provedthat any strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is a dictatorial. This framework models situationswhere public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have to be located within aconfined region that has the shape of a disc.
Keywords: public economics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2012
Number: 042
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:8571b798-2c13-49ee-8bd3-c118d56beae0/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 286513
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2012042