Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Öztürk Murat 
Author-Name: Peters Hans 
Author-Name: Storcken Ton 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences
Abstract: In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a polytope inthe Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the polytope. Asingle-best point is a point which is the unique point at maximal distance from some other pointof the polytope. It is proved that any strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is a dictatorshipunless the polytope has exactly two single-best points or it has exactly four single-best pointswhich form the vertices of a rectangle. In the latter cases strategy-proof and Pareto optimalrules can be obtained by committee voting (simple games) between the single-best alternatives.This framework models situations where public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclearplants have to be located within a confined region.
Keywords: public economics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2012
Number: 041
File-URL: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=1705
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 426191
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2012041