Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Herings P. Jean-Jacques 
Author-Name: Mauleon Ana 
Author-Name: Vannetelbosch Vincent 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents
Abstract: A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2010
Number: 025
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:e701f343-e33a-4740-b8d4-48ecc52941ce/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 334897
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2010025