Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Bozbay Irem 
Author-Name: Dietrich Franz 
Author-Name: Peters Hans 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
Abstract: Following Vartiainen (2007) we consider bargaining problems in which no exogenous disagreement outcome is given. A bargaining solution assigns a pair of outcomes to such a problem, namely a compromise outcome as well as a disagreement outcome: the interpretation is that the latter results if the compromise outcome is not accepted. For this framework we propose and study an extension of the classical Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We present a characterization with an axiom of Independence ofNon-Utopia Information as the main condition.
Keywords: mathematical economics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2010
Number: 008
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:b07d5040-7036-4205-9b19-329fe977a7b7/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 342196
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2010008