Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Driesen Bram 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Continuous fictitious play in zero-sum games
Abstract: Robinson (1951) showed that the learning process of Discrete Fictitious Play converges from any initial condition to the set of Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. In several earlier works, Brown (1949, 1951) makes some heuristic arguments for a similar convergence result for the case of Continuous Fictitious Play (CFP). The standard reference for a formal proof is Harris (1998); his argument requires several technical lemmas, and moreover, involves the advanced machinery of Lyapunov functions. In this note we present a simple alternative proof. In particular, we show that Brown''s convergence result follows easily from a result obtained by Monderer et al. (1997).
Keywords: mathematical economics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2009
Number: 049
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:5ac076d9-7c27-41f9-b346-9f25db08b65b/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 309932
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2009049