Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Herings P. Jean-Jacques 
Author-Name: Predtetchinski Arkadi 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Bargaining with Non-convexities
Abstract: We show that in the canonical non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game, a subgameperfect equilibrium exists in pure stationary strategies, even when the space of feasible payoffs is not convex. At such an equilibrium there is no delay. We also have the converse result that randomization will not be used in this environment in the sense that all stationary subgame perfect equilibria do not involve randomization on the equilibrium path. Nevertheless, mixed strategy profiles can lead to Pareto superior payoffs in non-convex cases.
Keywords: operations research and management science; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2009
Number: 042
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:d42bfc76-c128-44c7-aedb-d1b2c7585eb3/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 390708
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2009042