Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Driesen Bram 
Author-Name: Perea Andrés 
Author-Name: Peters Hans 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: The Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution with Loss Aversion
Abstract: We consider bargaining games under the assumption that bargainers are loss averse, i.e. experience disutility from obtaining an outcome lower than some reference point. We follow the approach of Shalev (2002) by imposing the self-supporting condition on a solution. Given a bargaining game, we say outcome z is self-supporting under a given bargaining solution, whenever transforming the game using outcome z as reference point, yields a transformed game in which the solution is z.We show that n-player bargaining games have a unique self-supporting outcome under the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution. We define a bargaining solution, giving exactly this outcome, and characterize it by the standard axioms of Scale Invariance [SI], Individual Monotonicity [IM], and Strong Individual Rationality [SIR], and a novel axiom called Proportional Concession Invariance [PCI].A bargaining solution satisfies PCI if moving the utopia point in the direction of the solution outcome, does not change this outcome.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2009
Number: 030
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:ccae10d5-8a0c-409c-b816-7c041b5b4b00/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 293155
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2009030