Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Leufkens Kasper 
Author-Name: Peeters Ronald 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Price dynamics and collusion under short-run price commitments
Abstract: We consider a dynamic homogenous oligopoly in which firms set prices repeatedly. Theory predicts that short-run price commitments have an increasing impact on profits and may lead to less price stability. The experiments that we conduct provide support for the first effect and against the second effect when a random ending rule is applied. Application of a fixed ending rule seems to reverse these findings, but none of the effects is significant.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2008
Number: 052
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:0729df4b-9631-4122-940e-820a429be42a/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 261387
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2008052