Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Flesch János 
Author-Name: Kuipers Jeroen 
Author-Name: Schoenmakers Gijs 
Author-Name: Vrieze Koos 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Subgame-Perfection in Stochastic Games with Perfect Information and Recursive Payoffs
Abstract: We consider a class of n-player stochastic games with the following properties: (1) in every state, the transitions are controlled by one player, (2) the payoffs are equal to zero in every non-absorbing state, (3) the payoffs are non-negative in every absorbing state. With respect to the expected average reward, we provide a constructive proof that a subgame-perfect ε -equilibrium exists in pure strategies, for every ε > 0. More-over, if all transitions of a game in our class are deterministic, then the game has a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in pure strategies.
Keywords: mathematical economics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2008
Number: 041
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:76fb9f70-eea5-493f-be38-4920252922cd/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 232491
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2008041