Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Kayi Çağatay 
Author-Name: Ramaekers Eve 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: An Impossibility in Sequencing Problems
Abstract: A set of agents with different waiting costs have to receive a service of different length of time from a single provider which can serve only one agent at a time. One needs to form a queue and set up monetary transfers to compensate the agents who have to wait. We prove that no rule satisfies efficiency of queues and coalitional strategy-proofness.
Keywords: mathematical economics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2008
Number: 040
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:ed41f53c-7ff6-456c-8732-0197a4f2ea94/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 171730
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2008040