Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Kuipers Jeroen 
Author-Name: Flesch Janos 
Author-Name: Schoenmakers Gijs 
Author-Name: Vrieze Koos 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Pure Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Free Transition Games
Abstract: We consider a class of stochastic games, where each state is identified with a player. At any moment during play, one of the players is called active. The active player can terminate the game, or he can announce any player, who then becomes the active player. There is a non-negative payoff for each player upon termination of the game, which depends only on the player who decided to terminate. We give a combinatorial proof of the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in pure strategies for the games in our class.
Keywords: mathematical economics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2008
Number: 027
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:75d4753c-35a8-4245-a1b1-bbb37b60541e/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 172746
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2008027