Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Ehlers, Lars 
Author-Name: Storcken, Ton 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Arrow's Theorem for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences
Abstract: In one-dimensional environments with single-peaked preferences we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow''s requirements, i.e. weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. When the policy space is a one-dimensional continuum such a welfare function is determined by a collection of 2N strictly quasi-concave preferences and a tie-breaking rule. As a corollary we obtain that when the number of voters is odd, simple majority voting is transitive if and only if each voter’s preference is strictly quasi-concave.
Keywords: mathematical economics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2007
Number: 043
File-URL: http://arnop.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=9243
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 223110
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2007043