Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Dietrich Franz 
Author-Name: List Christian 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Judgment aggregation with consistency alone
Abstract: All existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation require individual and collective judgment sets to be consistent and complete (in some recent results with completeness relaxed to deductive closure), arguably a demanding rationality requirement. They do not carry over to aggregation functions mapping profiles of (merely) consistent individual judgment sets to (merely) consistent collective ones. We prove that, whenever the agenda of propositions under consideration exhibits mild interconnections, any such aggregation function that is "neutral" between the acceptance and rejection of each proposition is dictatorial. We relate this theorem to the literature.
Keywords: mathematical economics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2007
Number: 021
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:3b81b5a2-eeb7-4595-8087-e2f1e7df5e85/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 142735
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2007021