Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Kóczy Lászlo Á. 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Sequential Coalition Formation and the Core in the Presence of Externalities
Abstract: Bloch (1996) presents a novel method to solve cooperative games with externalities. When trying to relate this to classical approaches he could only present negative results. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of Bloch''s model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core.
Keywords: Economics (Jel: A)
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2006
Number: 047
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:d09d58da-abbe-455b-885d-9c1f612000ff/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 203889
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2006047