Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Dietrich Franz 
Author-Name: List Christian 
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Judgment aggregation on restricted domains
Abstract: We show that, when a group takes independent majority votes on interconnected propositions, the outcome is consistent once the profile of individual judgment sets respects appropriate structural conditions. We introduce several such conditions on profiles, based on ordering the propositions or ordering the individuals, and we clarify the relations between these conditions. By restricting the conditions to appropriate subagendas, we obtain local conditions that are less demanding but still guarantee consistent majority judgments. By applying the conditions to agendas representing preference aggregation problems, we show parallels of some conditions to existing social-choice-theoretic conditions, specifically to order restriction and intermediateness, restricted to triples of alternatives in the case of our local conditions.
Keywords: mathematical economics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2006
Number: 033
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:5cd43ab0-ee04-4dfa-8024-47c3d2f2f882/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 227723
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2006033