Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Bochet Olivier
Author-Name: Storcken Ton
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules
Abstract: Domains of individual preferences for which the well-known impossibility theorems of Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite do not hold are studied. To comprehend the limitations these results imply for social choice rules, we search for the largest domains that are possible. Here, we restrict the domain of individual prefer ences of precisely one individual. It turns out that, for such domains, the conditions of inseparable pair and of inseparable set yield the only maximal domains on which there exist non-dictatorial, Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof social choice rules. Next, we characterize the maximal domains which allow for Maskin monotone, non-dictatorial and Pareto-efficient social choice rules.
Keywords: mathematical economics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2006
Number: 002
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:2f36e089-a151-4933-b3e1-ccaa315a37f1/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 206550
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2006002