Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Peleg Bezalel 
Author-Name: Peters Hans
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
Abstract: Effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives are considered. It is shown that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity function can be augmented with equalchance lotteries to a finite lottery model---i.e., an effectivity function that preserves the original effectivity in terms of supports of lotteries---which has a Nash consistentrepresentation. In other words, there exists a finite game form which represents the lottery model and which has a Nash equilibrium for any profile of utility functions, where lotteriesare evaluated by their expected utility. No additional condition on the original effectivity function is needed.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2005
Number: 030
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:a655166c-43b9-4558-88dd-f3dc64c1ad40/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 211634
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2005030