Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Ehlers Lars
Author-Name: Klaus Bettina
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Consistent House Allocation
Abstract: In practice we often face the problem of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., schools, housing, jobs, offices) to agents (e.g., students, homeless, workers, professors) when monetary compensations are not possible. We show that a rule that satisfies consistency, strategy-proofness, and efficiency must be an efficient generalized priority rule; i.e., it must adapt to an acyclic priority structure, except - maybe - for up to three agents in each object''s priority ordering.
Keywords: microeconomics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2005
Number: 007
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:e32b42f0-284a-4e3b-98bd-c25c49cd0477/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 217394
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2005007