Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Schulteis,Tim
Author-Name: Perea,Andres
Author-Name: Peters,Hans
Author-Name: Vermeulen,Dries
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games.
Abstract: In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in Perea (2003) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show how this can be interpreted as a refinement of sequential equilibrium. We also present a method to compute preference conjecture equilibria.
Keywords: econometrics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2004
Number: 008
File-URL: http://arnop.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=789
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 230870
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2004008