Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Maus,Stefan
Author-Name: Peters,Hans
Author-Name: Storcken,Ton
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Minimal Manipulability: Anonymity and Surjectivity
Abstract: Gibbard''s (1973) and Satterthwaite''s (1975) result implies that anonymous surjective social choice functions on more than two alternatives are manipulable. Placing some mild constraints on the number of agents compared to the number of alternatives, we show what the minimal number of manipulable profiles of such social choice functions is. Moreover, all such social choice functions attaining the lower bound are characterized. They show a trade off between minimizing manipulability and treating alternatives neutrally.
Keywords: mathematical economics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2004
Number: 006
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:53eb1dc1-4d88-4be4-a2f3-1ef6f1e8eafd/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 201167
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2004006