Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Peleg,Bezalel
Author-Name: Peters,Hans
Author-Name: Storcken,Ton
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Constitutional Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences
Abstract: A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable, and sufficient and almost necessary conditions for an arbitrary (but surjective) social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable. It is shown that the results apply to interesting classes of scoring and veto rules.
Keywords: mathematical economics; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2003
Number: 025
File-URL: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=765
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 236871
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2003025