Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Ehlers,L.
Author-Name: Peters,Hans
Author-Name: Storcken,Ton
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Threshold Strategy-Proofness: On Manipulability in Large Voting Problems
Abstract: In voting problems where agents have well behaved (Lipschitz continuous) utility functions on a multidimensional space of alternatives, a voting rule is threshold strategy-proof if any agent can only obtain a limited utility gain by not voting for a most preferred alternative,given that the number of agents is large enough. For anonymous voting rules it is shown that this condition is not only implied by but in fact equivalent to the influence of any single agent reducing to zero as the number of agents grows. If there are at least five agents, the mean rule (taking the average vote) is shown to be the unique anonymous and unanimous voting rule that meets a lower bound with respect to the number of agents needed to obtain threshold strategy-proofness.
Keywords: Economics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 2000
Number: 038
File-URL: http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=726
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 175048
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2000038