Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Storcken Ton
Author-workplace-name: METEOR
Title: Intransitive aggregated preferences
Abstract: An impossibility theorem for preference aggretating rules is discussed. In this theorem no transitivity condition or acyclicity condition is imposed on the preferences: neither on the individual level nor on the aggregated level. Under the conditions that aggregation is non-dictatorial, Pareto-optimal, neutral and independent of irrelevant alternatives, it follows that the aggregated preferences are much more complex and therefore less ordered than the individual preferences.
Keywords: mathematical economics and econometrics ; 
Series: Research Memoranda
Creation-Date: 1996
Number: 013
File-URL: http://digitalarchive.maastrichtuniversity.nl/fedora/objects/guid:de29cefd-98f1-4e55-b025-fcb6b16f30d3/datastreams/ASSET1/content
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 114484
Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:1996013