Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Khan A. 
Author-Name: Peeters R.J.A.P. 
Author-workplace-name: GSBE
Title: Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market
Abstract: We study the evolution of imitation behaviour in a differentiated market where firms are located equidistantly on a Salop circle. Firms choose price and quantity simultaneously, leaving open the possibility for non-market clearing outcomes. The strategy of the most successful firm is imitated. Behaviour in the stochastically stable outcome depends on the level of market differentiation and corresponds exactly with the Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. For high level of differentiation, firms end up at the monopoly outcome. For intermediate level of differentiation, they gravitate to a mutually non-aggressive outcome where price is higher than the monopoly price. For low level of differentiation, firms price at a mark-up above the marginal cost. Market clearing always results endogenously.
Keywords: Noncooperative Games; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games; Firm Behavior: Theory; Market Structure and Pricing: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; 
Classification-JEL: C72; C73; D21; D43; L11; L13; .
Series:  Research Memorandum
Creation-Date: 2013
Number: 022
File-URL: http://pub.maastrichtuniversity.nl/a45dd07a-d609-408a-aeea-30af1b5d7f58
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 413897
Handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013022