Template-type: ReDif-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Dur R. 
Author-Name: Neckermann S. 
Author-Name: Bradler C. 
Author-Name: Non J.A. 
Author-workplace-name: GSBE
Title: Employee recognition and performance: A field experiment
Abstract: This paper reports the results from a controlled field experiment designed to investigate the causal effect of public recognition on employee performance. We hired more than 300 employees to work on a three-hour data-entry task. In a random sample of work groups, workers unexpectedly received recognition after two hours of work. We find that recognition increases subsequent performance substantially, and particularly so when recognition is exclusively provided to the best performers.
Remarkably, workers who did not receive recognition are mainly responsible for this performance increase. This result is consistent with workers having a preference for conformity.
Keywords: Field Experiments; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects; 
Classification-JEL: C93; M52; .
Series:  Research Memorandum
Creation-Date: 2013
Number: 017
File-URL: http://pub.maastrichtuniversity.nl/19d9f9bf-abe5-457a-b5c9-ccbe5f46c707
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 433906
Handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2013017